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RECOVERING CITIZENSHIP AND
GOVERNMENT FROM POLITICS:
A RETURN TO THE FOUNDING
Forrest A. Nabors*
DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY (W. W. NORTON &
COMPANY 2014). PP. 315. PAPERBACK $19.95.
SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE
FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015).
PP. 350. HARDCOVER $38.00.

At this writing, just before Election Day in 2016, it is not too early to predict
that this year will be remembered for uncommonly nasty partisanship, rivaling
America’s most degraded national political contests. We have witnessed revelations
of appalling conduct behind closed doors, mob violence at political rallies all over
the country, and jaw-dropping recriminations leveled by both presidential candidates against each other. Polls have revealed broad and unprecedented dissatisfaction among Americans for both presidential candidates. The general feeling of the
electorate seems to be that regardless of who is chosen president on Election Day,
the people will have selected the one judged least bad, not the one judged best. Yet,
we know that clouds already hovered above national political life before the spectacular events of this year darkened them further. Entering 2016 low approval ratings of Congress were already customary, regularly bouncing around a range below
the approval ratings of our last two presidents. Increasingly, the electorate has identified as independent and has withheld affiliating with the major parties. Americans
seem well aware that the professionals in whom they have entrusted honest representation of their political views have failed them.
But here, we might pause to see hope in the storm. Popular revulsion may be
a sign that partisanship has not cut into the electorate beyond the professionals and
activists. The latter comprise the actors engaged in tawdry political theater and it
might be a mistake to confound them with the repulsed audience. This separation
could be explained by the thesis of Morris Fiorina, who argued that the American
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Alaska Anchorage.
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people are not so intensely polarized as the political class.1 Americans of many political stripes are united in disgust. Aristotle observed that popular disgust for extremism is a sign of deeper political health, because it shows that the size of the
middling element willing to obey reason is substantial.2 Hopefully, conditions are
ripening for cooler heads to cross discredited partisan lines and join in constructive
discussion and debate that the American people would welcome.
Perhaps we can take comfort in the defensible observation that the seeds of
renewal are sometimes found in declension, and perhaps decline itself plants those
seeds. Our infamous year might loosen the ties that bind the American people to
stale partisan creeds and policy agendas and open them to new ideas about our political life and government. If we take advantage of these conditions, thoughtful
Americans can make good use of two new books, Danielle Allen’s Our Declaration:
A Reading of the Declaration of Independence In Defense Of Equality, and a study of the
Federalist essays, Sanford Levinson’s An Argument Open to All: Reading The Federalist in
the 21st Century.3 Both return to our national origins in order to reflect on the present. In a political moment like ours, there is no better place to begin anew than at
the beginning, to shore up our vandalized national edifice.
Purged of academic jargon, the highly readable Our Declaration would be a Jane
Austen heroine at a dinner party, if books were people. Allen is an affable and deceptively modest writer, and she engages everyone at their level. Her book refers to
the divorce between Prince Charles and Princess Diana, the poetry of Sylvia Plath,
the indictment of Linda Tripp, and other examples drawn from ordinary life and
popular culture in order to patiently explain complex concepts implicated by the
Declaration.4 This is in keeping with her stated intention “to draw different circles
of readers together.”5 But, like a Jane Austen heroine, her book is full of erudition
and runs deep. At many points, Allen’s fellow travelers who also have studied and
revere the Declaration will receive a jolt from a new revelation that she has uncovered. Our Declaration has vaulted Allen into the front ranks of the Declaration’s defenders. As she notes, there are few studies like hers that treat the Declaration as a
philosophical argument rather than as an historic episode.6 Her book should be
paired with Carl Becker’s The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas as a study of contrasts.7 For Allen, the Declaration is always relevant, and

1. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, DISCONNECT: THE BREAKDOWN OF REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(2009).
2. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, 1295a34-1295b34 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press ed. 1984) (c.
384-322 BCE). Citations of Aristotle use the numbering system devised by Immanuel Bekker.
3. DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN
DEFENSE OF EQUALITY (2014); SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE
FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2015).
4. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 94, 102, 207-08.
5. Id. at 43.
6. Id. at 34.
7. CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS
(1922).
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she seeks to re-animate it for the American people.8 Becker historicizes the Declaration. For him, its time is past; it is obsolete.
This is a welcome book to those of us who are warmed by the confession of
Abraham Lincoln when he surveyed the scene of the Declaration’s birth, that “all
the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn . . . from the sentiments which
originated, and were given to the world from this hall.”9 That short, emotional address in Independence Hall on February 22, 1861 also reminds us that Allen’s book
is necessary. On the eve of Lincoln’s inauguration, the threat of assassination hung
over him precisely because of his filial devotion to our founding document. In a
sense, the Civil War was fought to either raise our Declaration higher or tear it
down.
We need Allen’s book because formidable foes, ranging from bitter enemies
to unconvinced critics, always have swelled the ranks arrayed against the Declaration. The Declaration has been, and sometimes still is, dismissed as a bundle of glittering generalities or as essentialist myth-making. The Declaration’s assertion that
“all men are created equal” has been assailed variously as erroneous, a self-evident
lie and inclusive only of white males. The passive disparagement of the Declaration
in our own day is evident even in scholarship that implicitly adopts the principles of
the Declaration for its moral premise. One eminent study of past advances toward
racial equality in America omits the Declaration among the decisive factors that the
authors highlight. Their omission does not seem quite right when one considers
those periods of racial progress and the rising popularity of the Declaration’s language, which was weaponized by successful civil rights movements.10 An argument
could be crafted from Our Declaration showing that the close historical coincidence
between successful agitations for greater freedom in American political history and
wider appeals to the Declaration was a causal relationship, and not accidental.
Allen argues that the Declaration “helps us see that we cannot have freedom
without equality.”11 Political philosophy has erroneously taught “that equality and
freedom are necessarily in tension with each other,” and Americans “have swallowed this argument whole.”12 Our Declaration sets out to correct this malnourishment. In summary of her book, the Declaration shows that equality is the surest
guarantor of freedom. It is an unusual document because although it consists of
words like any other, its words are actions that are aligned to the precepts about
equality that it contains. In other words, the Declaration marks a kind of genesis: a
mysterious moment of self-enlightenment or spontaneous self-awakening to natural
equality upon which a people composing a new nation stakes and maintains its
claim to the right to be free. Further, it is unusually apt at inspiring new self8. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 42.
9. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 240 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953)
[hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS OF LINCOLN].
10. PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL
EQUALITY IN AMERICA 4 (1999).
11. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 21 (emphasis original).
12. Id. at 23.
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awakenings across the ages by being read and studied. The Declaration is an active
power for freedom, and equality is its foundation.
The brief Prologue unveils Allen’s argument and its urgency. Part I relates
chapters in her personal life in order to bear witness to the enduring importance of
the Declaration. Parts II & III provide a concise history of the drafting process,
proving that it would be mistaken to reflexively think of the Declaration as the
product of Jefferson’s isolated retreat into his study. In fact, its language passed
through many hands and many conversations.13 This is important because the
terms of justice found in the Declaration, which they wrote together, requires group
writing.14 Part IV through most of Part VIII is where the heavy lifting of the book
takes place. Allen walks the reader through a careful exegesis of the text of the Declaration.15 The goal of this section is to uncover five facets of equality in the Declaration’s argument.16 The Epilogue connects the general argument of the book to
the meaning of equality previously explained.17 Although her history of the drafting
process is interesting and convincing, the parts that deserve most scrutiny are her
personal reflections and the exegesis.
In Part I, Allen discloses surprisingly intimate details about her personal life,
but there is more to her meaning than might meet the hasty eye. This section
demonstrates the power of the Declaration to teach its seminal lessons; to elevate
and unify citizenship; to illustrate how each of us is strengthened by our individual
recognition of natural equality; and to show why liberty is fleeting in political society
unless that liberty is grounded in equality.18
She recounts how her “life-tested night students” at the University of Chicago
engrossed the Declaration for the first time and read it closely with her.19 The
working night students knew even less than the little that her more privileged day
students knew about the Declaration, but at the end of their study, they were transformed.20 The Declaration had taught them the profound meaning of who they and
we all are – naturally equal human beings and inheritors of a nation founded upon
the recognition that this is who we all are.21 Her students saw and grasped their patrimony.22 They gained a new vocabulary to speak about politics and their citizenship gained new life.23 Allen witnessed this effect on her students, which transformed her, and gave her a new appreciation for the power of the Declaration.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 107-267.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 108-09.
Id. at 275-82.
Id. at 36-44.
Id. at 33.
Id.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 38.
Id. at 35.
Id.
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Second, Allen relates her family history. She is a child of a biracial marriage.24
Her African-American father left Florida because he tired of racial prejudice.25 Her
white mother descended from Michigan Progressives.26 Around their dinner table,
they discussed freedom and equality and the Declaration of Independence.27 Then
she shares a painful story. When her mentally ill maternal grandmother was undiagnosed and untreated, she subjected the youthful Allen to cruelty.28 With the help of
her family, she learned to ignore her grandmother’s barbs and to quietly insist to
herself that in an important and appropriate sense she was equal to her adult white
grandmother.29 This gave her the strength to bear the difficulty and left her with a
lasting memory that later motivated her to teach others and give them similar
strength.30 She learned how to dismiss attempts to debase her by mentally embracing the meaning of natural equality, that none may be exalted above another nor
debased below another with justice.31 At a young age, she knew that her grandmother had erred.
But in most political societies, we cannot secure our liberty by ignoring wouldbe tyrants. The book of Exodus in the Bible drove this lesson home for her.32 Although Joseph enjoyed liberty and prosperity under the pleased eye of Pharaoh, another Pharaoh succeeded to the throne who “knew not Joseph” and enslaved his
descendants.33 This taught her that only the establishment of equality as the standard for political life can assure the perpetuity of liberty. Without equality, the survival of liberty is subject to the caprice of rulers.
Taken together, Allen’s personal reflections suggest how the Declaration
solves the problem of division by identity and creates union among the citizenry,
securing freedom for all. Defenders of the Declaration have long believed this. This
is evident in another speech that Lincoln gave to an earlier generation of “lifetested” Chicagoans, 150 years before Allen’s cohort. Lincoln estimated that perhaps
as many as half of all Americans at that time were not descended by blood and flesh
from the generation that was present during the American Revolution.34 But
when they look through that old Declaration of Independence they find that those
old men say that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal,” and then they feel that that moral sentiment taught in that day evidences their
relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral principle in them, and that they
have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 36.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 37.
Id. at 36-38.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.
Id.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id.
2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 499 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953).
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of the men who wrote that Declaration, (loud and long continued applause) and so
they are.35

That is, blood and flesh do not constitute our most important civic bond that,
like an electric cord, vivifies the merely legal union of citizenship. Our common
humanity is the only condition for eligibility to partake of that bond. Our devotion
to those words constitutes that bond, and converts us all into the descendants of
the Founding Fathers who wrote those words, much in the same way that belief in
and devotion to the truths revealed by religion convert people into inheritors of the
promises of their god, who becomes their common father. The votaries become
one family, united and transformed by their faith. Likewise, all who believe and devote their way of life to the words in the Declaration can claim the founders as our
common fathers, and can claim their work, the Declaration and its recognition of
our equality, as a patrimony that belongs to all of us. We can all be their true inheritors. If our legal union is imbued with this character, we are impregnable against
tyranny from any quarter because we will be prepared to spring to the defense of
each other’s liberty when danger comes.
This time, the teacher is not Lincoln but Allen, an African-American woman
who insists on claiming her full share of our common patrimony given to us by the
Declaration.36 But how can she reconcile that inheritance and the bleaker inheritance, the nation’s historic failings towards segments of our population, especially
towards African-Americans? Her formal answer comes later in her book, arguing
that the central idea of the Declaration gradually reformed illiberal habits that were
inherited by the founding and contradictory to its founding ideal.37 This is a sufficient answer, substantiated by Aristotle, who points out that habits cultivated by a
pre-existing political regime can survive revolution and the establishment of a new
regime.38 Her better answer is the whole book, and it is signified by the figure of
Joseph, to whom she alluded in her short account of the Israelites in Egypt.39 Joseph is an appropriate model for Allen’s project, which demonstrates and subtly
explains how all members of historically oppressed groups can reconcile these contradictory inheritances and contribute to liberating all from the burden of history.
By their own treachery, Joseph’s brothers had him dragged into slavery. When
they see Joseph the next time and behold his prosperity and power at the court of
Pharaoh, they go down on their faces and beg for forgiveness. But Joseph tells
them, “Do not be afraid . . . you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good,
in order to bring it about as it is this day, to save many people alive.”40 The hard
path by which many kidnapped Africans found themselves in America became a
hard residency, plagued by long affliction originating within the American family of
35. Id. at 499-500 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ¶ 1 (1776)) [hereinafter THE
DECLARATION].
36. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 36.
37. Id. at 240-45.
38. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.
39. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 107.
40. Genesis 50:19-20 (New King James Version).
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citizens. This mass kidnapping and oppression was an incalculable evil. But the intended evil put them in a position from which they eventually could rise and gain
the right to claim an incalculable good, this patrimony. In Our Declaration, Allen
summons her command of logic, etymology, history, and philosophy to teach this
patrimony and “save many people alive.”41 Her detour into the personal burnishes
the purpose of her project and prepares us to take it seriously.
The first facet of equality that Allen wrings from the Declaration is the condition of being free from domination, which we might say is her working definition
of liberty.42 The Declaration begins by referencing the “course of human events,”
which revealed a pattern, an intention on the part of the British Crown to dominate
the colonies.43 They were impelled, pushed “to assume among the powers of the
earth” a “separate and equal station.”44 But she disclaims equating this pushing with
historicist inevitability.45 The threat of domination did not foreordain that the colonists would draw the appropriate lesson, and Allen stops short of explaining why
they did draw that lesson and choose their fork in the river of events, rather than
another. Probably, there is no explanation. Like philosophical instruction provided
by the teacher in Plato’s Seventh Letter, domination can teach, but it cannot guarantee the enlightenment of the student, which happens by some inexplicable miracle.46 In their encounter with the threat of domination, the Americans might have
accepted the yoke, as some nations have done, and abandoned their founding ideal.
The Declaration itself acknowledges this contingency, stating that “a Tyrant . . . is
unfit to be the ruler of a free people.”47 That is, a people willing to be slaves is fitted for a tyrant. But as a nation, the Americans had awakened to their natural equality, shook off the tyrannical pretension of the British government, and insisted, “We
are your equals!”48 They chose the harder alternative, war, in order to escape domination and change the course of events.49
But why did “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them” to their
new station?50 Allen answers, because the equal right to avoid domination and survive is fundamental.51 Here, and in many other places, the oldest strains of political
philosophy are visible in her exegesis. Rebellion against domination is a justified
second stroke in war, not the first stroke, Aquinas reminds us, because tyranny is
41. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 107.
42. Id. at 122, 129.
43. Id. at 114 (discussing THE DECLARATION, ¶ 1).
44. Id. at 114, 119.
45. Id. at 132, 185.
46. Plato writes, “Thus much at least, I can say about all writers, past or future, who say they know the things
to which I devote myself . . . . There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject. For it does not
admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life
lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself.” PLATO, THE PLATONIC EPISTLES 135 (J. Harward trans., Cambridge University Press, 1935).
47. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 30.
48. Id. at 119.
49. Id. at 111.
50. Id. at 130.
51. Id. at 134.
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war already commenced.52 The proper purpose of war is peace, says Aristotle, and
primarily should be undertaken to prevent becoming enslaved.53 Threatened domination pushed the Americans out of their former political order and pushed them
into a new political order—their union. Allen writes, “political order emerges from
the human need to gather together peaceably,” but in the old political order domination broke the peace.54 The colonists needed each other to restore peace. Their
liberty and mutual recognition of their equal right to liberty became the basis of
their new union.
In this context, Allen addresses the thorny issue of God, noting that nonbelievers in the present day are proliferating.55 Must we be theists, believing in
merely some creator, in order to accept the argument of the Declaration with respect to the natural right? Allen says no, and that we can set the question aside.56 In
this instance, she seems to want to avoid contending with the difficult implications
of changing religious opinion in our times. However, it is hard to see why inequality
is any less justifiable than equality, if you knock down even the thinnest conception
of a divinity. In fact, Allen describes such a conception: Aristotle’s “divine force”
that “set the universe in motion . . . by giving everything in nature its goals or
ends.”57 Of course, it is possible that support for equality can persist without rationally respectable justification. But is blind prejudice in support of equality a reliable pillar?
In one of the most striking stretches of the book, Allen carefully explains the
famous second sentence beginning, “We hold these truths . . . that all men are created equal” and reveals something new.58 She collapses the five claims beginning
with the word “that,” into three categories: truths about human beings, truths about
government, and the right of revolution.59 Restated, the famous second sentence is
a syllogism with two premises, concluding that “[a]ll people have a right to a
properly constituted government.”60 This is a valuable and persuasive analysis.
This leads to the second facet of equality: the equal right of access to the instrument of government.61 This teaching depends on the phrase that the people
have the right to arrange government “in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”62 In Aristotelian fashion, Allen recognizes that human beings are political by nature, because nature has given us the
power to reason about self-protection and happiness.63 The Aristotelian claim is the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON KINGSHIP, TO THE KING OF CYPRUS 27 (Gerald B. Phelan trans., 1982).
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk VII, 1333b371333a30, 1333b35-1334a2.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 117.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 138, 182.
Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 151-70 (quoting THE DECLARATION, ¶ 2).
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 153.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 184 (quoting THE DECLARATION, ¶ 2).
Id. at 173, 184.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss3/21

8

Nabors: Recovering Citizenship and Government from Politics: A Return to

2017]

RECOVERING CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT

575

implied premise of the Declaration, from which is derived this right of equal access,
or, by the terms of our political society, equal civil and political rights. However, she
seems to slightly err when she imputes the view to the Declaration that “None can
judge better than I whether I am happy.”64 It would be closer to the truth to say
that the Declaration recognizes that each of us are in the best position to judge our
own happiness. It surely does not teach the view that each one’s opinion of his or
her pursuit of happiness is unerringly true opinion. Politically, this slight difference
in meaning is significant, for it cuts short debate about the good life, sanctifying
every chosen activity as equally good. She is more convincing when she identifies a
feature of the Declaration that is the most beautiful to her, its optimism that the
people are capable of judging well.65
Next comes the third facet of equality, the collective capacity of a people to
acquire knowledge, specifically recognition of good and evil, or the exercise of “political judgment.”66 The sentence beginning, “Prudence, indeed, will dictate . . . ,”
shows that the good judgment of the political community depends upon the ability
of people to exercise prudence, distinguishing between sufferable and insufferable
evils.67 That is the standard that a self-governing people must meet. The list of
grievances, Allen convincingly argues, is not a formal indictment.68 It is “a model of
political judgment. . . . in action,” that shows how a people should distinguish good
and bad government.69 If the people can read and understand this model, then this
proves the Declaration’s hypothesis, “that all people are created equal.”70 Allen’s
night class proved the hypothesis no less than the Americans in 1776.
The fourth facet of equality is the expectation of reciprocity or “a certain
symmetry or equality between . . . actions.”71 This is modeled by the sentence, “In
every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress . . . .”72 Once
again, she reveals something striking, that the respective word counts of the recollected petition and reply are precisely equal—ten words.73 This models reciprocity,
the test of justice in civil relations among free and equal people.
The fifth and last facet of equality is “co-creation and co-ownership of our
shared world.”74 The British failed the test of reciprocity; therefore, the Americans
declared to them, as their equals, that their political bands are abolished.75 Allen
again surprises, recasting the entire document as a series of actions constituting another syllogism. The Declaration says that a people may rebel against growing tyr64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

ALLEN, supra note 3, at 184.
Id. at 183, 186.
Id. at 191, 228, 233.
Id. at 194 (quoting THE DECLARATION, ¶ 2).
Id. at 207-209.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 228.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 246 (quoting THE DECLARATION, ¶ 3).
Id. at 249.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 258.
Id. at 261.
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anny; that King George was becoming a tyrant; and therefore, it is their right and
duty to declare independence.76 They appeal to “a candid world” to publicly show
the justice of their cause and they mutually stake their lives on the truth of what
they say.77 Their joint actions demonstrated mutual responsibility for their actions,
modeling how a political order based upon equality should conduct itself in the
presence of humanity.78
In closing, Allen writes, “the achievement of equality is the sole foundation on
which we can build lasting and meaningful freedom . . . .”79 Surely, it is easy to accept the position that natural equality is the only firm basis of liberty. Tyrants of all
kinds who have robbed freedom from others have always found refuge in the selfserving assertion of natural inequality. But, Allen unconvincingly continues, this “is
a fundamentally anti-libertarian argument,” made more urgent because liberty has
drubbed equality in our public life.80 Is it true that liberty has soared while equality
(at least in the sense that she means it) has taken a beating? Allen offers little proof
to support this observation. More importantly, she isolates and criticizes the defense of greater liberty as a threat to equality, as if liberty and equality are competitors in a zero-sum game.81 She maintains that liberty is not possible without equality, which is well-taken, but seems to find that equality is possible, perhaps even
preferable, without the broadest liberty.82 It could be argued that liberty and equality are mutually dependent in the Declaration, and that the diminution of one necessarily diminishes the other. Although Allen’s argument justifying the urgency of the
book is exposed to criticism of this kind, it consumes only a small part of the book.
The only other problem worth notice is her assimilation of the “separate but
equal” doctrine and the “separate and equal station” passage of the Declaration.83
Allen argues the passage from the Declaration provided grounds for segregationists
to oppress others.84 However, these ideas are incommensurable. Self-segregation to
vindicate liberty and equality is very different from forced segregation, for the purpose of oppression, justified by the false claim that the segregated were equal. Tyranny always borrows and perverts the language of liberty to hide its designs. This
brief passage should have been cut.
Nevertheless, these minor defects hardly detract from the great value of the
whole. Allen’s ringing final appeal for wider studies of the Declaration is a good
ending, given all that she has explained so beautifully about its power, which she
witnessed in her personal life.85 We learn that a citizenry well-versed in the Declaration naturally will grow in affection for equality, liberty, and humanity. Then they
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 260-65.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 269.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 276.
Id. at 21-22, 276.
Id. at 22-23, 275.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 123-25.
ALLEN, supra note 3, at 124-125.
Id. at 275-282.
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can smoothly move to inquiring into the form and structure of our government,
which is endued with the responsibility to preserve American equality and liberty,
and to respect the equality and liberty belonging to others.
The form and structure of our government in actual operation is taken up by
Levinson. An Argument Open To All consists of commentary on each of all eightyfive Federalist essays.86 Typically, studies of the Federalist use the essays to better
understand the political theory of Publius or scour them for evidence establishing
the original meaning of the Constitution. The task that Levinson assigns to himself
is different. He informs the reader that his “presentist” study attempts to address
political questions in our day.87 Levinson identifies vexing problems foreseen and
not foreseen by Publius, problems the Constitution failed to foreclose. The book
brims with illustrative examples from early to recent history of the republic. His
commentary is provocative by design, which is immediately evident.
Federalist 1 addresses the character and capacity of the American people to
govern themselves.88 Publius famously predicted that their conduct would decide
“the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”89 Levinson doubts that Americans have proven that they can be trusted to discuss and decide “absolutely basic questions at the heart of governance.”90 He asks, “Do we
think that is possible today, or is it a quixotic, even potentially dangerous fantasy?”91 Regarding the claim that Americans were “one united people” in Federalist 2,
Levinson demonstrates its “utter fatuity” as an empirical fact when it was written,
and instead interprets Publius to be emphasizing the importance of homogeneity.92
Due to the nation’s moderate success at maintaining stability despite our heterogeneity, he asks whether the “belief about the significance of homogeneity was completely without merit?”93 But he also poses an alternative view, that our heterogeneity has undermined our bonds, that the idea we are one united citizenry is a fiction,
and that “our political system is so wholly committed to interest-group politics that
it is completely legitimate for a voter . . . to be concerned exclusively with his or her
private interests,” especially the partial interests of identity groups.94 Federalist 9
and 10 argue that the extended republic curbs faction.95 Levinson approvingly
points out that religion is cited by Publius as a catalyst of faction, and he suggests
adding another to the list of catalysts, patriotism, which “can easily lead to the deni-

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

LEVINSON, supra note 3.
Id. at 3.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Gideon ed. 2001) [hereinafter FEDERALIST].
LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 9 (quoting FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), at 1).
Id. at 12.
Id..
Id. at 12-13 (quoting FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 2 (John Jay), at 6.
Id. at 17.
LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 17.
FEDERALIST, supra note 88, Nos. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) & 10 (James Madison), at 37-49.
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gration of those who are not members of that community. . . .”96 Hence, Levinson
is suspicious of moral, religious, and certain kinds of civic education, and he suggests that the extended republic created by the Constitution only “provides some
marginal protection.”97 He hints that the expansion of secularism and the ebb or
redefinition of patriotism will improve our odds against factionalism.
Regarding the interior or institutional structure of the government, Levinson
is equally critical. National elections are insufficiently democratic, even after major
reforms. The right to vote “remains an extraordinary volatile political issue.”98 Most
congressional elections are not competitive.99 Because our population has increased
so much, the proportionately smaller House of Representatives inadequately represents constituents.100 Regardless of widely diverging populations, all states send exactly two Senators to Washington, and therefore, the Senate is malapportioned.101
The secondary consequence is that the Electoral College malapportions voting
power in presidential elections.102
The theory of the separation of powers outlined in Federalist 51 has failed,
Levinson argues, because although Publius soberly recognized that partisanship is
an eternal fact of political life, he fatally missed foreseeing the rise and strength of
organized parties, which reward loyalty and punish disloyalty in public service.103
Advancement is impossible without party support, which has strengthened the role
of partisanship in government.104 Because party discipline aligns public servants
against each other, the separation of powers has “yielded endless gridlock and ineffective government.”105 The Senate and the presidents have increasingly clashed
over foreign policy and nominations.106 Presidents have resorted to using the denomination “agreements” for treaties in substance, in order to skirt the duty to seek
ratification by the Senate.107 Publius did not foresee this, although he recognized
“unsettling implications” if a president were to settle foreign policy without Senate
participation.108 He did foresee the possibility that the Senate and president might
reach impasse over a nomination.109 But he predicted that the rules would favor the
president because the Senate would have to fear that after the rejection of one nominee, the president would nominate another candidate even more distasteful.110
Levinson acknowledges that despite increasingly contentious nomination battles,
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 202.
See id. at 206-220.
LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 236-37.
Id. at 260-61.
See id. at 191-196 (discussing FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 51. (James Madison), at 267-72).
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.
LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 241-245.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 288-92 (discussing FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), at 391-95).
Id. at 291 (discussing FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 51 (James Madison) at 391-95).
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experience has vindicated the sagacity of Publius on this point, and presidents have
held serve.111 However, Levinson prophetically wonders whether increased polarization might eventually encourage the Senate to withhold its concurrence indefinitely, an idea recently advanced by Republican Senators with respect to the current
vacancy on the Supreme Court.112
Under the pressure of partisanship, the presidency arguably has become monarchical, which worries Levinson.113 Presidents have exceeded their authority and
arrogated legislative powers.114 To avoid nomination battles with the Senate, presidents increasingly have used recess appointments, and to accommodate themselves,
have stretched the definition of “recess.”115 A president could not declare war as
monarchs could, Publius says, but Levinson reminds us that repeatedly presidents
have exercised war powers since World War II, never with a congressional declaration of war and sometimes without even the concurrence of the Congress.116
By measuring the handiwork and arguments of Publius against present day
problems, Levinson wants to spur our own “reflection and choice,” so that we can
be our own Publius, and advance our own bold solutions.117 In this vein, he finds
“the most truly inspiring passage” in all of the essays in Federalist 14, where Publius
rejects, “‘the unnatural voice’ that ‘petulantly tells you that the form of government
recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world . . . that it rashly
attempts what it is impossible to accomplish.’”118 Levinson also believes we also
should not fear innovation.119 We should inquire into “what improvements are
necessary in our own time.”120 He asks, does not Publius say that the chains of the
Constitution “are made to be broken when circumstances demand it?”121 In short,
he uses Publius against Publius.
However, Levinson respects the constitutionally prescribed means by which
we modify government. Although he objects to parts of our present Constitution,
he is a constitutionalist; nowhere does he endorse end-runs around the Constitution, and he shares the concern of Publius in Federalist 50 that “parchment barriers” will not prevent partisan encroachments against, and usurpations of properly
assigned powers, as contemporary examples demonstrate.122 For this reason, lifetime tenure of federal judges worries Levinson, even more than Publius. A possibility that Publius foresaw in Federalist 78 has come to pass, that judges might smug-

111. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 291.
112. Id. at 250-51.
113. Id. at 255.
114. Id. at 260.
115. Id. at 257-60.
116. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 268-69 (discussing FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), at
355-62).
117. Id. at 53 (quoting FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), at 1).
118. Id. at 52 (quoting FEDERALIST, supra note 88, No. 14 (James Madison), at 66.
119. Id. at 53-54.
120. Id. at 54.
121. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 93.
122. Id. at 186-87.
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gle their own legislative preferences into their decisions and “might be ‘disposed to
exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT.’”123
Levinson’s open endorsement of breaking the chains of the Constitution
when circumstances demand it, raises the important question, whether he wants to
change the form of the political regime that the Constitution was meant to establish, or whether he wishes to improve it. Whatever the Constitution’s flaws, Publius
clearly expects that the government formed under the Constitution will be republican in form, which Levinson acknowledges in his commentary on Federalist 39.124
There, Levinson calls out the word “indirectly” in the definition Publius gives for
republican government: “‘a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people . . . .’”125 In contrast to Publius, Levinson
would prefer that “all primary political leaders are popularly elected,” which is clear
when he reviews the democratic deficits of Congress and the Electoral College. 126
He does not agree with the argument that the indirect election of presidents and
senators promotes wisely administered government, while simultaneously insuring
that the public servants are accountable to the people. For him, the distance between the people and the public servants should not be remote. Publius and Levinson both support the genus of republicanism but Levinson, unlike Publius, favors
the species of democratic republicanism, or democracy. However, at this time in
American political history, the difference between the straight republicanism of
Publius and the democratic republicanism of Levinson is immaterial, because creeping monarchism in our system threatens all species of republicanism.
First, the emergence of the powerful presidency, as Levinson depicts it, is part
of an historical trend that is ongoing. A reformed Congress that is structured and
elected in perfect harmony with Levinson’s democratic ideas changes little for the
better if the legislative branch continues to lose power to the executive branch. The
monarchic presidency developed first, because the Constitution failed to include
sufficient barriers that might have contained the early presidents. Due to this error,
the presidents acquired new power for the office through neither constitutional nor
unconstitutional means, but rather, through extra-constitutional means. They seized
greater authority because they could. The earliest presidents upheld the original
theory of the presidency and vetoed only bills that they deemed unconstitutional.
Then, they vetoed bills that were disagreeable to their policy preferences. Woodrow
Wilson then formalized the practice of Theodore Roosevelt, who appealed directly
to the people, to force a legislative agenda on Congress.127
Now the monarchic form of the presidency that Levinson describes treads on
unconstitutional territory. Levinson documents a recent controversy that points to
the next major transition in the presidency from initiator of legislation to legislator.

123.
124.
125.
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127.

Id. at 303.
Id. at 142.
Id.
LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 142.
See JEFFREY TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
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Pressed to do something about unauthorized foreign residents, President Obama
“rebuffed earlier calls by political liberals to act, by reminding them that he was not
a ‘king.’”128 After his re-election, Obama famously began warning Congress that he
had “a pen and a phone.” He acted. If the assertion of executive power in this fashion becomes accepted, the strategic balance between the Congress and the presidency further shifts. In that event, the role of Congress would begin to transition
from authoring law to influencing law, or in other words, towards the role of the
later Roman Senate, which finally became a rubber-stamp to the Caesars.
The seizure and exercise of greater authority by the executive is not the exclusive deed of the executive, but is encouraged by the bloc that favors a particular
policy. Levinson notes that President Obama first resisted political liberals who
were pressuring him to act.129 Similarly, Levinson remarks that the American colonists “were in fact highly critical of King George for not exercising what they insisted was his continuing power to veto laws passed by Parliament.”130 The point that
Levinson wants to make in this context is that republicans in America found themselves oddly defending the dead “Stuart theory of the British monarchy,” a memory
preserved by the reference to the nonexistent king’s veto in Federalist 69. The larger, unstated point substantiated by the two episodes is that policy partisanship can
influence the developmental direction of the political regime in ways that the policy
partisans might not initially recognize in the heat of political struggle, and that they
might later rue after their policy battle is won. Power abhors a vacuum, and if policy
partisans can win by gaining the aid of a sympathetic princely power within the system, they will seek it. The American presidency has certainly demonstrated susceptibility to accumulate power in this way.
Second, the advancement of the politically popular idea of good government
that Levinson advocates contributes to strengthening the new monarchism that
chafes against his democratic principles. Levinson openly shares his political views.
He favors a strong national government that takes up good works for the general
welfare, and weights passages that support his object.131 In Federalist 45 Publius
argues for the subordination of state sovereignty to the union for “the public good,
the real welfare of the great body of the people.”132 Levinson uses this part of the
text to oppose “absurdly sacrificing the ends set out in the Preamble for a fetishistic
piety toward what later generations would call ‘states’ rights.’”133 Addressing the
concern that the citizenry might not obey the national government in Federalist 27,
Publius dismisses this possibility, reassuring his reader that “the general government
will be better administered than the particular governments.”134 In other words,
Levinson says, “The more one becomes accustomed to the new government. . . the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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more it will take on the status of a friend whose ministrations are to be embraced
rather than feared.”135 In support of securing adequate revenues in Federalist 30,
Publius writes, “A complete power [is] indispensable.”136 Without revenues, Levinson comments, “polities inevitably decline.”137
But the goal of the partisan opponents of Levinson is to “‘drown’ the national
government by starving it of tax revenues.”138 According to him, these partisans see
“the [national administrative] state as an affront to, rather than a guarantor of ‘civilization.’”139 They oppose the creation of “a better-functioning national bureaucracy” and sufficient taxes that would pay “administrators truly adequate salaries.”140
Bedeviled by “anti-governmental radicalism,” he wonders, “Can any political system
survive – at least without indeed calling on force of arms to quell popular discontent. . .?” Against these partisans, Levinson argues, Publius “was not a libertarian
who saw the government’s role as limited to providing for the common defense. He
consistently adopts a robust notion of government.”141
We can trace Levinson’s idea of good government back to Woodrow Wilson.
For Wilson, good government should incorporate a robust national administration
managed by educated experts, and he looked to Europe for his model.142 Although
he admits that the European monarchies developed the administrative state, he reassures his hearers that if we engraft this feature into American Government, the
change will not bend the American regime towards monarchy.143 We would borrow
the European idea and democratize it. Given Levinson’s concern that the executive
branch has developed towards monarchy, it might be fair to ask whether the development of the administrative state instead has monarchized us, a development that
Levinson dislikes.
Levinson recognizes that defenders of states’ rights and limited government
stand in the way of completing the construction of a powerful, centralized administrative state that he wishes to see built. He does not inquire whether the achievement of this goal will alter the republican character of the American political regime. But near the end of his life, Madison explained the importance of federalism
to the maintenance of republicanism. The purpose of dividing the powers of government in twain was to insure the perpetuity of self-government “over the parts
and over the whole, notwithstanding the great extent of the whole.”144 The value of
federalism is that it maintains republican self-government over a large territory, not
to preserve provincialism or state pride at the expense of a broadly national cosmo-
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Id. at 113.
LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 113.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 116.
Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 204-205 (1887).
Id. at 219-20.
9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 430n (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1902) [hereinafter MADISON WRITINGS].
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politanism, as Levinson suggests.145 Therefore, the loss of self-government in the
parts for the sake of centralized state-building is a serious change to the political regime.
Federalism is simply a device for structuring republican government that
solves the problem of size; and, that is its sole but essential value. A cardinal principle of republicanism is that the people or their representatives upon whom the law
operates must be the makers of the law. In a large nation of 320 million dispersed
people, the requisite of this principle is met, if the whole people or the representatives of the whole decide the question whether to go to war, because war affects the
whole nation. If the question is whether to build an eleven-mile road in one corner
of that nation, affecting only 700,000 people of that state, the principle is violated if
the whole people decide the question, because the people of the state upon whom
the law operates constitute a tiny fraction of the makers of the law. It does not matter if the purest democratic means are employed by the whole people to decide the
question. The net effect is that an outside power makes the law for the people who
must obey the law, and when an outside power governs, it is not self-government,
but imperial government.
No republic had ever been so large as the United States in 1776, and so their
problem of preserving self-government and preventing imperial government of the
whole over the parts was new and unique. To implement their solution of dividing
government, Madison continued, they had to decide where to draw “the untried
demarcation of the line which divides the general and the particular Governments,”
and this was a “most arduous and delicate task.”146 In form, the method by which
they effected the division was “an enumeration and definition of the powers,” most
visible in Article I, section 8. He added, “the success of this new scheme . . . . depends on the faithful observance of this partition of powers,” and “the friends of
liberty and of man, cannot be too often earnestly exhorted to be watchful in marking and controlling encroachments by either of the Governments on the domain of
the other.”
In an earlier day, the watchful friends of liberty fought Calhoun and his acolytes who upset the delicate balance and assigned greater weight to the states. The
political purpose of these apostates of constitutional fidelity was to protect their ruling state oligarchies from the reforming arm of the national government. But Levinson sees a nominal, and not a major difference in substance between the theories
of Calhoun and Madison, despite the fact that Madison reviewed the theories of the
former, and denied their author could be “within the pale of the republican
faith.”147 Unfortunately, many defenders of state self-government today also conflate Madison and Calhoun, Founding theory and Confederate theory, as Levinson
notes.148 This conflation of the sacred and profane has unjustly discredited the orig145.
146.
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inal theory, which deserves a fair hearing, because in our day, the balance is upset in
the other direction. The purpose of those, like Levinson, who endorse tipping the
balance against the states, is founded on well-intended aims to gratify “the remarkable sweep of services we now demand from a national government.”149 The demand for greater services and the organization of government to supply them meets
the conditions of a theory of de Tocqueville, that the repeated satisfactions of
popular demand for succor incrementally strengthens central powers, with the result that soft despotism could grow out of democracy itself.150 Equality might be
retained, but the people would be equally subjected to despotism, stripped of liberty.
In Federalist 46, Publius addresses the concern that the federal government
might extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over the states, and that the national
government might dominate the whole system. In reply to this concern, Levinson
asks, “So what?”151 Imperial government and the loss of liberty, that’s what. If the
national government assumes all powers formerly divided between state and national government and, combined with this change, national power is concentrated
in the executive, supported by a vast bureaucracy unaccountable to the people, the
result is a potent monarchic concoction. But Levinson is too interested in the good
works that a national bureaucracy could achieve to see that the success of his political aims will produce more of what he dislikes; the effects of completing the demolition of state self-government cannot be reconciled with his democratic convictions.
Pushed forward by political movement of this kind, the American political regime has traveled back to its pre-revolutionary origins. In Our Declaration Allen
writes that Jefferson’s Summary View of the Rights of British America was a “preview” of
the Declaration, arguing that the British Parliament “had no authority over the colonies.”152 The fundamental problem denounced by the Summary View was imperial
rule, which is to say, rule over and not self-rule.153 The laws that the Americans
were forced to observe were not the laws of their own making, as republicanism
demands. What was their recourse? The same recourse available to my fellow citizens in Alaska today, when they are told by the federal government, and do not decide, whether they may build an eleven-mile road to save Alaskan lives, and when
they are told by the federal government, and do not decide, where the line should
be drawn between environmental stewardship and the development of their struggling local economy. Their recourse is to travel 4,000 miles to supplicate an administration that haughtily waves the Supremacy Clause at them, just as Benjamin
Franklin traveled 4,000 miles to supplicate the haughty imperial administration in
149. Id. at 49.
150. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 640-45 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop
trans., 2000)
151. LEVINSON, supra note 3, at 174.
152. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 50.
153. See 2 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 54 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905) [hereinafter WORKS OF JEFFERSON].
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1774.154 The scene of Franklin’s debasement in the Privy Council is, unfortunately,
too often repeated in ordinary Americans’ interactions with their government today.
Americans then and now know they cannot exercise “reflection and choice”
and decide many important questions that interest them infinitely more than federal
administrators, who nevertheless decide for them, and are many degrees beyond direct accountability to local people. We should not wonder that, fatigued by frustration, the American people turn away from political life, lose the interest and capacity to debate and vote, and indeed, lose the vitality of a flourishing free people when
the responsibility for self-government is taken from them. Levinson does not recognize the possibility that the enervating effect of the administrative state on citizenship is the cause of his doubt that the people are really capable of “reflection
and choice.” In other words, the administrative state becomes self-justifying. In
similar fashion, the debilitating effect of slavery on human beings drove slaveholders’ doubt in natural equality, and chattel slavery became self-justifying.
Nor should we wonder at the agitations of other citizens who have not forgotten their patrimony and persist in demanding it back, nor that these citizens run
into a wall of self-interested opposition. The administrative state has created incomes, interests and dependencies; in sum, another class of citizens who are the
beneficiaries, and are interested in preserving the new system of government that
provides the benefactions. This wedge deliberately driven into the heart of the
American people also has antecedents in pre-revolutionary America. In his Novanglus letters, John Adams calls out Americans who were working against American
liberty for the sake of gaining a place on the imperial payroll.155 Can we blame
Americans today, if they see circumstances similar to that of our forebears and tend
towards defiance? Jefferson went farther. He directly addressed the king in the
Summary View, invoked natural right, declared the imperial laws void, and in closing,
wrote “Let those flatter who fear; it is not an American art.”156
The remedy that emerges from the Summary View is a complete reinterpretation of the British political order, in which the colonies would govern themselves
with regard to local concerns, and become a co-equal and integral part of the British
union presided by the king. The division of government in Jefferson’s reinterpreted
British order is the same plan upon which the provisions in the Constitution stand.
That plan, Madison said at the end of his life, was to divide and organize “power as
will provide at once for its harmonious exercise on the true principles of liberty.”157
Madison singled out that feature and the moral foundation of the republic, rooted
in the consent of the people, as “the two vital characteristics of the political system
of the United States.”158 Standing on that moral foundation and holding that plan
154. KENNETH LAWING PENEGAR, THE POLITICAL TRIAL OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: A PRELUDE TO THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 90-97 (2011).
155. 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 18-19 (Charles Francis
Adams ed., Charles C. Little & James Brown 1854).
156. WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 153, at 87.
157. See MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 144, at 430n.
158. Id.
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for a government that protected liberty, many Americans then said to London, as
today they say to Washington, D.C., “We are your equals!”159

159. See id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss3/21

20

